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Abstract
We develop a general framework to analyze the distribution functions of
wealth and income. Within this framework we study wealth distribution in
a society by using a model which turns on two-party trading for poor people
while for rich people interaction with wealthy entities (huge reservoir) is rele-
vant. At equilibrium, the interaction with wealthy entities gives a power law
(Pareto-like) behavior in the wealth distribution while the two party interac-
tion gives a distribution similar to that reported earlier [1, 2].
The distribution of wealth in a nation has been a subject of interest for a long
time. An empirical observation due to Pareto [3] states that the higher income group
distribution has a power law tail with exponent varying between 2 and 3. As for the
lower income group distribution it is exponential or Gibb’s like. The Gibb’s law has
been shown to be obtainable when trading between two people, in the absence of
any savings, is totally random [4, 1, 5, 2]. The constant finite savings case has been
studied numerically by Chakraborti and Chakrabarti [1] and analytically by us [2].
Furthermore a power law behavior has been reported for the higher income group
when the savings are taken to be random [6, 7].
In this paper, we try to identify the processes that lead to the wealth distribution
in societies. Our model involves two types of trading processes - microscopic and
macroscopic. The microscopic process involves trading between two individuals
while the macroscopic one involves trading between an individual and the macro-
system. The philosophy is that small wealth distribution is governed by two party
trading while the large wealth distribution involves big players interacting with
the macro-system. The big players mainly interact with large entities/organizations
(which they are not directly part of) such as government(s), markets of other nations,
etc. These entities/organizations are treated as making up the macro-system in our
model. The macro-system is thus a huge reservoir of wealth. Whereas the poor are
mainly involved in trading with other poor individuals. Hence, our model invokes
the microscopic channel at small wealths while at large wealths the macroscopic
channel gets turned on.
2The details of our model are as follows. An individual possessing wealth larger
than a cutoff wealth (yc) trades with a fraction [(1 − λ) with 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1] of his
wealth (y) with the macro-system with the latter putting forth an equal amount of
money [(1 − λ)y]. The trading involves the total sum [2(1 − λ)y] being randomly
distributed between the individual and the macro-system. Thus on an average the
macro-system’s wealth is conserved. As regards individuals that possess wealth
smaller than yc they engage in two party trading where two individuals i and j put
forth a fraction of their wealth (1− λ)yi and (1− λ)yj respectively. Then the total
money (1 − λ)(yi + yj) is randomly distributed between the two. The total money
between the two is conserved in the two-party trading process. We assume that
probability of trading by individuals having certain money is proportional to the
number of individuals with that money.
We will now develop a formalism similar to Boltzmann transport theory so as to
obtain the distribution function f(y, y˙, t) for wealth (y), income (y˙), and time (t).
Similar to Boltzmann’s postulate we also postulate a dynamic law of the form
∂f
∂t
=
{
∂f
∂t
}
ext source
+
{
∂f
∂t
}
interaction
. (1)
The first term describes the evolution due to external income sources only and can
be written as a continuity equation
{
∂f
∂t
}
ext source
= −
∂(y˙f)
∂y
−
∂(y¨f)
∂y˙
. (2)
We will first analyze the microscopic channel. As was derived earlier on by us
(see Ref. [2]), for the case involving only two party interaction with no upper cutoff,
the distribution function for the money of a person to lie between y and y + dy is
given by
f(y) =
∫ ∞
y
dL
(1− λ)L
∫ min[L,y/λ]
max[0,{y−(1−λ)L}/λ]
dxf(x)f(L− x). (3)
We will now obtain the above equation within the Boltzmann type transport formal-
ism. If we assume that there is no external income source, then
{
∂f
∂t
}
ext source
= 0.
The second (non-trivial) term can be obtained as follows in terms of a balance
equation.
∂f
∂t
=
{
∂f
∂t
}
interaction
= gains− losses. (4)
In the above equation the two terms on the right hand side can be expressed in
terms of transition rates r(y1, y2; y
′
1, y
′
2) for a pair of persons to go from moneys y1y2
3to moneys y′1y
′
2. Then we have on assuming that the distribution function is only a
function of wealth and time (such as when income is proportional to one’s wealth)
∂f(y1, t)
∂t
=
∫
r(y′1, y
′
2; y1y2)f(y
′
1, t)f(y
′
2, t)dy2dy
′
1dy
′
2
−
∫
r(y1, y2; y
′
1, y
′
2)f(y1, t)f(y2, t)dy2dy
′
1dy
′
2. (5)
In the above equation, conservation law requires y1 + y2 = y
′
1 + y
′
2. Hence in the
first integral we treat y2 as redundant and integrate out with respect to it to yield
a normalization constant. Similarly in the second integral y′2 is integrated out. Now
for the transition rate in the first integral of the above equation we have
r(y′1, y
′
2; y1y2) ∝
{
1
(1−λ)(y′
1
+y′
2
)
if λy′1 ≤ y1 ≤ y
′
1 + (1− λ)y
′
2
0 otherwise.
(6)
On taking into account the restriction that no one can have negative money and
setting y′1 + y
′
2 = L, the first integral is proportional to∫ ∞
y1
dL
(1− λ)L
∫ min[L,y1/λ]
max[0,{y1−(1−λ)L}/λ]
dy′1f(y
′
1)f(L− y
′
1). (7)
As regards the second integral, at equilibrium we assume that the transition from
y1 to all other levels is proportional to f(y1). Also since at equilibrium
∂f(y1,t)
∂t
= 0,
we obtain the distribution function to be that given by Eq. (3).
On introducing an upper cutoff yc for the two party trading, the contribution to
the distribution function f(y) from the microscopic channel becomes
∫ ∞
y
dL
(1− λ)L
∫ min[L,y/λ]
max[0,{y−(1−λ)L}/λ]
dxf(x)f(L−x)[1−θ(x−yc)][1−θ(L−x−yc)]. (8)
Next, we will analyze the macroscopic contribution to the distribution function
f(y). The macroscopic contribution to
{
∂f(y1,t)
∂t
}
interaction
is given by
{
∂f(y1, t)
∂t
}
reservoir interaction
=
∫
r(y′1; y1)f(y
′
1, t)dy
′
1
−
∫
r(y1; y
′
1)f(y1, t)dy
′
1. (9)
Total money involved in trading (between individual and the macro-system) is
2y′1(1 − λ). After interaction, the resulting money y1 of the individual satisfies
the following constraints λy′1 ≤ y1 ≤ (2− λ)y
′
1. The first transition rate r(y
′
1; y1) in
the above equation is given by
r(y′1, ; y1) ∝
{
1
2y′
1
(1−λ)
if λy′1 ≤ y1 ≤ (2− λ)y
′
1
0 otherwise.
(10)
4As before, at equilibrium the second integral on the other hand is proportional to
f(y1) when only the macroscopic channel is operative.
On taking into account an upper cutoff yc, the contribution to the distribution
function f(y) from the macroscopic channel is∫ y/λ
y/(2−λ)
dxf(x)
2x(1− λ)
θ(x− yc). (11)
Then f(y) is given by the sum of the two expressions given in Eqs. (8) and (11) for
the microscopic and the macroscopic channels respectively. Now it is interesting to
note that the solution of the equation
f(y) =
∫ y/λ
y/(2−λ)
dxf(x)
2x(1− λ)
, (12)
is given by f(y) = c/yn. To obtain n one then has to solve the equation
(2− λ)n − λn = 2n(1− λ), (13)
and obtains n = 1, 2. Only n = 2 is a realistic solution because it gives a realistic
cumulative probability. It is of interest to note that the solution is independent of
λ . Next, we would like to mention that we have chosen the trading probability of
a person with certain money, whether above the cutoff yc or below it, is determined
purely by the number of people at that money. However, if the interactions above yc
occur with a smaller probability governed by a prefactor α then Eq. (12) becomes
f(y) = α
∫ y/λ
y/(2−λ)
dxf(x)
2x(1− λ)
. (14)
The solution of the above equation is again a power law of the form 1/yn with n
depending on both λ and α and is plotted in Fig. 1. When α < 1, at smaller values
of λ, there are two solutions for n with the smaller solution being less than unity
and at larger values of λ there is only one solution. We have plotted only the larger
solution for all values of α as it is the only realistic solution from a cumulative
probability point of view. From Fig. 1 we see that at a given value of α < 1, as λ
increases the value of n and its gradient increases. Furthermore, for a fixed value of
λ, as α decreases the value of n increases.
Hence the distribution function, after simplification, is given by
f(y) = [1− θ(y − (2− λ)yc)]
[∫ 2yc
y
dL
(1− λ)L
∫ min[L,y/λ]
max[0,{y−(1−λ)L}/λ]
dxf(x)f(L− x) ×
[1− θ(x− yc)][1− θ(L− x− yc)]
+ α
∫ y/λ>yc
yc
dxf(x)
2x(1− λ)
]
+θ[y − (2− λ)yc]
f [y − (2− λ)yc][y − (2− λ)yc]
n
yn
. (15)
5Here it must be pointed out that Eq. (15) yields, as in the case of the purely
microscopic channel without an upper cutoff, when the savings are zero (λ = 0) and
y → 0
f ′(y) ≈ −f(y)f(0). (16)
In obtaining the above equation we again assumed that the function f(y) and its
first and second derivatives are well behaved. Then the solution for small y is given
by
f(y) ≈ f(0)exp[−yf(0)]. (17)
We solve Eq. (15) iteratively by choosing a trial function, substituting it on
the RHS and obtaining a new trial function and successively substituting the new
trial functions over and over again on the RHS until the difference between the
new trial function fn and the previous trial function fp satisfies the accuracy test∑
i |fn(yi)− fp(yi)| ≤ 0.005.
In Fig. 2 we depict, for the zero savings case (λ = 0) and α = 1, f(y) with the
cutoff set at ten times the average money per person and the average money person
(yav) being set to unity. The distribution, as expected, decays exponentially for
small values of y and has power law (1/y2) behavior for y > 2yc = 20. In Fig. 3 we
plot f(y) with the cutoff yc = 0.25, yav = 1, and α = 1 for values of savings fraction
λ = 0.1, 0.5, 0.9. Here the power law behavior (1/y2) takes over for y > (2 − λ)/4.
At smaller values of y they all become zero with the curves at higher λ’s approaching
zero faster similar to the case of the purely two-party trading model (see Ref. [2]).
Next, in Fig. 4 we show the f(y) behavior at values of the cutoff yc = 1/4, 1/5, 1/6,
yav = 1, λ = 0.5, and α = 1. As expected the 1/y
2 behavior starts at y = 1.5yc.
At smaller values of y the behavior is similar to the purely two-party trading model
studied earlier (see Ref. [2]). Lastly, in Fig. 5 we depict f(y) for yc = 2, yav = 1,
λ = 0.5, and values of α = 0.8, 0.9. The power law behavior (1/yn) starts at y = 3
with n = 4(3.209) for α = 0.8(0.9) [8].
In this paper we introduced a new ingredient - interaction of the rich with wealthy
entities and obtain power law behavior similar to Pareto law. On the other hand
the wealth distribution of the poorer part of the society is accounted for through
two-party trading.
The authors are grateful to B. K. Chakrabarti for useful discussions and support.
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FIGURE CAPTIONS
1. Plot of the power law index n versus λ for values of α = 0.8, 0.9, 0.95, 0.99, 1.
2. Plot of the money distribution function for zero savings and cutoff being ten
times average money. Both α and the average money per person are set to unity.
3. Money distribution function for various savings values (λ = 0.1, 0.5, 0.9). The
average money per person and α are both set to unity and the cutoff to one-fourth
the average money.
4. Money distribution f(y) at yav = 1, λ = 0.5, α = 1, and various cutoff values
(yc = 1/4, 1/5, 1/6).
5 Money distribution f(y) at yc = 2, yav = 1, λ = 0.5, and values of α = 0.8, 0.9.
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